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Isaac, now rehabilitated. All this material is minutely examined and the history and composition of the various parts discussed in an interesting and valuable introduction of 64 pages. The ancient scholia have come down in full in two manuscripts: Marcianus 476, which Scheer designates as *s*; and Neapolitanus II D 4, which he calls *s*³. Two manuscripts consulted by Tzetzes, *s*⁴ and *s*⁵, belong to the same class. In addition there are the occasional notes added by Nicetas (*s*²); and *s*⁶ used by the unknown grammarian of the fifteenth century in editing Tzetzes; besides Vaticanus 1307 (V), which is a copy of *s*. One manuscript of Isaac Tzetzes is cited and four of his brother John, whose library Scheer attempts to reconstruct. He accepts Reitzenstein's conclusion that the older paraphrase was based in great part upon the mutilated scholia of Sextio, and not upon the version which now exists; and Sextio, he thinks, drew from Philogenes, to whom we are indebted for whatever learning of the ancient grammarians is still to be found in the scholia. Philogenes thus becomes something more than a name. So, too, he attempts to drag Orus from his obscurity. Theon has been somewhat better known for a long time. The resemblances to various passages in the scholia to the *Aeneid* are also examined. There still remain, however, many points to settle.

Of the actual editing of the volume little can be said by way of criticism. The text of the different manuscripts is given, with the apparatus criticus at the foot of the page. It is a thorough and careful piece of work done by a man entirely familiar with his subject. His wide reading is shown by the numerous references, noted in the margin, which include not only the Greek authors, but very often scholia. References to the scholia of three or four different writers may be found cited for a single passage. The one thing which may be missed is an *index rerum*. Such an index would make the volume more accessible to other than Lycophron scholars; and its absence is only partially made up for by the index of the writers mentioned in the text. But this is a mere trifle. We are fortunate in having so excellent an edition of the scholia to Lycophron, and it is much to be hoped that other Greek authors may fare as well.

WILLIAM N. BATES

Neue Untersuchungen über Platon. Von CONSTANTIN RITTER.
München: Oskar Beck, 1910. Pp. viii + 424.

This republication of the studies in Plato written since his epoch-making *Untersuchungen* of 1889 is designed by Professor Ritter to accompany the crowning work for which all the rest have been a preparation—his *Platon*, which will be reviewed in our next number. The studies included in this volume deal with the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, the *Philebus*,

with Sprachstatistik in application to Plato and Goethe, the meaning of εἶδος and ἰδέα and similar words in Plato, and the letters attributed to Plato and Speusippus. Professor Ritter's mastery of Platonic usage and the sobriety of his judgment preserve him from all the extravagances of fantastic and a priori Platonic interpretation. To much of his analysis of the *Sophist* and *Philebus* I heartily assent, and if it were worth while I could quote confirmatory passages from my own papers. He is undoubtedly right, for example, in maintaining that Plato did not take the "Divisions" of the *Sophist* so seriously as to require us to emend all seeming imperfections and inconsistencies out of them. It is unquestionable also that the polemic against the εἰδῶν φίλοι is either Plato's rectification of his own former statements or preferably his protest against misinterpretation; that the αἰ λεγόμενα of the *Philebus* are simply *Sätze*, sentences, in human speech, and that the introductory metaphysical categories of the *Philebus* are in the main merely a general statement of the method of logic to be applied in the following discussion. (Cf. "Recent Platonism in England," *AJP*, IX, 280, 282-85; *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, 12, n. 3.)

My differences with him begin at the points where he makes concessions to those who discover inconsistencies or fundamental changes of opinion in Plato, and they depend on distinctions so nice and subtle that it is perhaps vain to hope for a complete understanding. He does not seem to me to make sufficient allowance for the idea which I emphasized in my *Unity of Plato's Thought* that inconsistency, more or less disguised by metaphor, is to be expected in relation to ultimate metaphysical problems, and that since we all live in glass houses we are not justified in throwing stones. I mean, to take the most obvious example, that it is unreasonable to complain of inconsistency or poetic vagueness with regard to the problem of evil, or the relation of the *Ding-an-Sich* to phenomena. All philosophies here take refuge in metaphor which will not bear close logical analysis. The only escape from this sort of self-contradiction is to be found in hard-headed, materialistic positivism, and that too, as the *Theaetetus* shows, has its own difficulties.

Now, the hypostatized ideas are Plato's *Ding-an-Sich*, deliberately accepted with full perception of the apparent absurdity of the doctrine from the point of view of common sense, as preferable to the alternative of Protagorean relativity. It is quite true, as Professor Ritter says, that mythical, poetic embellishment of the hypostatized idea is confined to a few dialogues. There was no reason why Plato should go on repeating himself forever. It is quite true that nearly everything that Plato says about the εἶδος or ἰδέα in the later dialogues admits of a perfectly rational, logical interpretation in terms of conceptualism. But this does not justify the theory that Plato distinctly abandoned in these later dialogues a doctrine of the hypostatized idea, which he maintained in the earlier

ones. I am not quite sure that Professor Ritter actually holds this view, but he certainly makes regrettable concessions to it. He is repelled by the sentimentalists who make too much of the poetic amplification of the noumenal idea in the well-known passages of the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, and he desires to reduce that element in Platonism to a minimum. He is entirely right in maintaining that beneath or behind the mythological decoration there is always a firm logical framework of common sense. It is also true that this logical aspect of the ideas predominates in the later dialogues. But there is no good evidence of a positive break or change of opinion at any stage of the continuous development. The blending of the two tendencies in the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* will of itself always be enough to refute any such theory. Plato may have ceased to delight in repeating his poetic and mythical descriptions of the noumenal idea. But the metaphysical necessity for such a postulate in the background of his philosophy remained unaltered. (See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, 29, 37.) And the very dialogues in which the poetic mythology is most prominent hint not obscurely that it is not to be taken too seriously, as Professor Ritter himself repeatedly points out in the case of the *Phaedo*.

The *Timaeus* is explicit in its reaffirmation of the noumenal idea, and Professor Ritter is no more successful than others have been in the attempt to break the force of this testimony. He says of the question there asked, ἀρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ (51-52), that Plato's and our meaning in giving an affirmative answer is merely that the concept represents some objective reality.¹ "Jedenfalls ist es eben der Gedanke einer objektiven Grundlage, eines in der Natur gegebenen festen Haltes für das, was wir uns in der Form abstrakter Allgemeinheit denkend vorstellen, dessen Berechtigung untersucht werden soll und schliesslich kurzweg durch die Erinnerung an die Verschiedenheit wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis von der unwissenschaftlichen richtigen Vorstellung (νοῦς—δόξα ἀληθείης) verbürgt wird." But the same interpretation is equally applicable, as Professor Ritter half admits, to the *Phaedrus* and the *Phaedo*, and if so, why not to the *Republic* and the *Symposium*? The theory, then, of a radical change of doctrine falls to the ground.

The Platonic hypostatization of *all* concepts will always be a stumbling-block to common sense. We need not for that reason endeavor to banish it from Platonism. The true method of interpretation is, first, to point out that the paradox is no greater than that involved in every system of metaphysics when thought out to the end, and then to show (1) that Plato adopted it with his eyes open, and (2) the motives that

¹Cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, 22: "et primarie quidem doctrina idearum nihil aliud evincere vult quam notiones existere, hoc est verba quibus reddunda in ratione utamur aliquid certi significare, quod per definitiones aliquatenus exprimere possimus et ad perspicue disputandum adhibere debeamus."

made it impossible for him to limit the hypostatization to any particular class of ideas. It is true that this demands a deeper insight into the nature and limits of metaphysical and epistemological speculation generally than the majority of Platonic interpreters will ever possess.

I have thought it more profitable to discuss this larger problem than to attempt to catalogue the wealth of detail which these essays present. It is enough to add that no student of Plato can afford to neglect this volume. It will take its place beside the earlier volume of *Untersuchungen* as an essential part of every Platonist's working library.

PAUL SHOREY

ANTI MIAΣ. An Essay in Isometry. Vol. I. By R. J. WALKER. London: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. vii+507. \$6.50.

Mr. Walker's thesis is that within the sphere of Dorian lyric, including the choruses of tragedy, the equivalence of two short syllables with one long syllable in responsion is never permissible. He is thus at the opposite pole from Herkenrath (see *Classical Philology*, Vol. III, p. 360) and the "new metric," if it may be so called, of Schroeder or Wilamowitz. He finds in the received text of Pindar fifty-six cases of the forbidden equivalence, eighteen in Bacchylides, a hundred and three in Aeschylus, a hundred and seven in Sophocles, and too many to count in Euripides. All of these he removes by emendation. To do this with even the appearance of plausibility demands considerable scholarship and appalling labor. But in view of the enormous antecedent improbability we must be permitted to wish that all this toil had been devoted to a better cause. The equivalence of two shorts and a long is a priori acceptable to the most refined rhythmical sense. There is no proof that it is arbitrarily and absolutely rejected by the Greeks. There is nothing to go upon except the fact that it is comparatively rare in the more old-fashioned and severe poetry. This plainly does not justify the wholesale emendation attempted here. Though some of these emendations are ingenious, few, if any, carry conviction. There is space for only two or three specimens of Mr. Walker's method. In Pind. Ol. 2 the first line of the epode has been corrupted throughout with a view to getting rid of one of three successive short syllables. In the first epode in the line *λοιπὸν γένει. τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων* the last word is a corruption for *πεπερασμένων*. The error thence spread throughout the poem.

In *Pyth* 4. 31 for *δαίπν' ἐπαγγέλλοντι* or Bergk's *ξένι* he restores from *Eustathius* and *Athenaeus* the Laconian gloss *ἄϊκνον* reading *ἄϊκν' ἐπαγγέλλοντι πρῶτον*. Five hundred pages of this sort of thing will make thought-provoking reading for the few scholars who appreciate and enjoy the game. But the reviewer stands helpless before it.

PAUL SHOREY